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Abstract
We provide the first individual-level test of whether holding supranational elections in
the European Union fosters satisfaction with European Union democracy. First, we
examine whether participation at the European Parliament election fosters satisfaction
with democracy and whether, among those who participated, a winner–loser gap
materializes at the EU level. Second, we examine under which conditions participating
and winning in the election affect satisfaction with European Union democracy, focusing
on the moderating role of exclusive national identity. Our approach relies on panel data
collected during the 2019 European Parliament elections in eight countries. We dem-
onstrate that while participating and winning increase satisfaction, such positive boost
does not materialize among those with exclusive national identity. These findings hold
an important message: elections are no cure to deep-seated alienation.
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A key argument in favour of electoral democracy is that people will accept (and
consent to) a political authority only if they have been given the opportunity to
choose who will govern. In line with this argument, democratic theory expects
elections to boost system support, commonly measured with satisfaction with
democracy, among those who have participated in the election regardless of wheth-
er they have won or lost since elections ‘have a legitimizing capacity strong enough
to counter the negatives associated with defeat’ (Esaiasson, 2011: 103). This rep-
resents ‘the essence of democracy: rule of the people by the people’ (Lindberg,
2006: 1). The ‘winner–loser gap’ literature further tells us that those who supported
a party now in government express even higher levels of satisfaction with democ-
racy. There is plenty of evidence supporting the so-called ‘winner effect’ on polit-
ical legitimacy and system support (e.g., Anderson and Guillory, 1997; Blais and
Gelineau, 2007; Dahlberg and Linde, 2017).
There are also expectations — albeit few empirical tests — about the fact that
the fundamental linkage between electoral democracy and political legitimacy is
crippled at the supranational level. This is mainly due to the fact that, compared to
first-order national elections, supranational elections have far less at stake. This is
broadly expected to be true especially with respect to European Parliament (EP)
elections. Since, historically, EP elections are not followed by a process of govern-
ment formation and fail to engage the public in a Europe-wide event (Marsh and
Mikhaylov, 2010), neither holding elections nor winning elections is expected to
lead to higher satisfaction with democracy (see also Singh et al., 2012).
In this study, we propose the first systematic test of whether or not holding
democratic elections fosters citizens’ satisfaction with European Union democracy
(SwEUD) during the 2019 EP elections. We do so by building bridges between
democratic theory and the winner-loser gap literatures with research on suprana-
tional elections that have thus far remained largely isolated. In particular, this
study tests two contending arguments. The first argument examines whether or
not, in line with democratic theory, participation in the EP elections per se fosters
citizens’ satisfaction and whether the winner–loser gap materializes at the
European Union (EU) level, as it does in first-order national elections. We
expect a weak but positive effect of the 2019 EP elections on SwEUD. The positive
effect is mainly due to the circumstances under which the 2019 EP elections have
been held (Marsh, 2020). Specifically, while European citizens vote directly to elect
their representatives that will sit at the EP since 1979, the actual powers of the EP
have been greatly expanded by successive treaty amendments (Hix et al., 2007;
Rittberger, 2005). In addition, European election campaigns have started to
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become increasingly more salient in the media and a strategic arena for political
parties to position themselves on EU issues (Van der Brug and Vreese, 2016) and
this seems particularly true in 2019 (De Wilde, 2020). Hence, we expect on the one
hand that those who participate in the EP elections display a higher degree of
satisfaction than abstainers. Furthermore, among voters, those who supported a
winning party will be more satisfied than those who voted for a losing party.
Our second argument specifies the boundary conditions with respect to this
positive effect of elections. In particular, we test the argument that deep-seated
alienation and hence lack of European identity limits the positive effect of partic-
ipating and also of supporting a winning party on SwEUD. What is more, EP
elections commonly foster the politicization of Europe (Grande and Hutter, 2016)
and provide visibility to anti-EU parties (Halikiopoulou et al., 2012; Van Elsas
et al., 2019); this means that EP elections may actually expose Europe’s weaknesses
rather than fostering the European idea (Beaudonnet and Franklin, 2016). From
this perspective, those alienated with the EU, its institutions and ideal are
reminded about Europe’s weaknesses, hence nullifying the positive effects of hold-
ing elections.
To test our expectations, we make use of panel data in eight countries. Although
the evidence presented in this article is only correlational, the panel data allow us
to measure satisfaction with democracy pre and post election and hence observe
changes in satisfaction between the two waves. Our findings show that while par-
ticipating and winning produce positive changes in satisfaction, there is no such
boost among those who identify exclusively with their country. The study discusses
the meaning of our results for the wider debate about EU political legitimacy.
Accepting electoral defeat, celebrating victory?
Is there an increase in satisfaction with democracy when people vote? According to
democratic theory the answer is a resounding ‘yes’. Elections give voters the oppor-
tunity to hold the government accountable and choose the representatives that will
rule the countries for years to come. As such, elections have the potential to confer
legitimacy to the political system and the existing literature shows that both win-
ners and losers react positively to elections with a significant post-election increase
in satisfaction with democracy (Esaiasson, 2011). Pushing it even further, using 24
panel studies, Kostelka and Blais (2018) demonstrated that voter turnout affects
citizens’ satisfaction and not the other way around. In other words, elections
increase satisfaction with democracy among those who vote, and especially
those who win the election. The fact that the latter group, i.e., the winners, will
show higher levels of support than the losers, known in the existing literature as the
‘winner-loser gap’, is one of the most robust findings in social sciences (e.g., Curini
et al., 2015; Dahlberg and Linde, 2017). In national elections, the winner group
includes all those voters who have voted for the parties forming the government
after the elections (Anderson and Guillory, 1997).
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Now, is this true for supranational elections too? In other words, should we
observe an increase in satisfaction with democracy after the EP elections for voters
but not for non-voters and for winners more than for losers? To the best of our
knowledge, the expectations of neither the democratic theory nor the winner-loser
gap theory have been systematically tested at this level. Thus far, the few studies
that have looked into the question of satisfaction with democracy beyond the
national level have either focused on district level results — albeit still in the con-
text of national elections (e.g., Blais and Gelineau, 2007; Henderson, 2008) — or
have compared presidential vote choice with that at the congressional (district)
level in the United States (Anderson and Lotempio, 2002). Such studies show that
winning in a district is rather unimportant, but the results are mixed: for example,
Blais and Gelineau (2007) find an independent effect of winning at the district level
whereas Anderson and LoTempio (2002) and Henderson (2008) do not. Lastly,
there exists some literature on the winner-loser gap in EU referendums in
Germany, Finland, and the Netherlands (Brummel, 2020) and in the Brexit refer-
endum (Nadeau et al., 2019; Schaffner, 2020). Albeit not directly focused on sat-
isfaction with democracy, these studies suggest a moderate but positive effect of
winning a referendum on support for direct democracy and the acceptance of the
referendum result.
The existing literature on European politics would suggest a null effect of elec-
tions for at least two reasons. First, the presence of election campaigns with no real
‘European’ content (Hix, 2008; Franklin and Hobolt, 2011; Mair and Thomassen,
2010) means that EP elections are so detached from the average voter that we
should not observe an effect on satisfaction with democracy. Second, studies
report that voter preferences expressed in EP elections have little impact on
decision-making in the EP, and voters are reminded of this every five years
(Beaudonnet and Franklin, 2016). EP elections generally fail to motivate public
interest (De Vreese et al., 2006; Reif and Schmitt, 1980) resulting in low turnout
and vote choice based on national, rather than European, policy concerns (Hobolt,
2012). Consequently, we should not expect turning out to vote or winning to
enhance SwEUD.
Yet, recent trends suggest that voting or winning at the EP election could
increase citizens’ satisfaction. A series of changes have enhanced the relevance of
the electoral process at the EU level. First, recent studies have provided evidence of
an emerging European party system at the EP level, based on left-right ideology
rather than national considerations (Hix et al., 2006). Second, EU institutions have
grown in importance for the policy-making process at the national level (Schmitt,
2005). Third, the EP, whose composition is at stake during the EP elections, has
expanded its policy competences over the years (Hix et al., 2007; Rittberger, 2005).
In addition, since 2014 and precisely in response to the EU ‘democratic deficit’
(Weiler et al., 1995), the EP has attempted to strengthen ‘the political legitimacy of
both Parliament and the Commission’ by ‘connecting their respective elections
more directly to the choice of the voters’ (European Parliament, 2012), with the
so-called Spitzenkandidaten process. On the basis of this system, the nominated
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lead candidate (‘Spitzenkandidat’) of the party with the largest number of seats in
an EP election is supposed to become President of the European Commission. The
Spitzenkandidaten process was introduced to enhance the democratic legitimacy of
the EU by establishing a direct relationship between the outcome of the election
and the presidency of the European Commission and by reducing the ‘second-
orderness’ of EP elections (Hobolt, 2014). Last but not least, the amount of atten-
tion EP elections receive from the media has increased substantially over the past
10-15 years (Van der Brug and Vreese, 2016). Clark and Rohrschneider (2009) find
a surprisingly strong effect of EU-level factors on electoral choice already in the
1999 EP election. For the first time ever, in the 2019 EP elections turnout levels
have gone up in many EU countries reversing long-term declining trends. To sum
up, although we do not claim here that EP elections are now first-order elections, it
makes sense to hypothesize that recent trends have led to both increased satisfac-
tion, in line with democratic theory, and a winner-loser gap in the 2019 EP
election.
In particular on winning, an increase in SwEUD may come from both the
performance of the supported party at the national level and the performance of
the European party to which that party is affiliated to at the European level.
Although EP elections are less relevant than national elections with respect to
their consequences for the actual distribution of power (Beaudonnet and
Franklin, 2016), the ‘winner–loser gap’ literature expects a boost in satisfaction
with democracy among winners not just because voters have obtained a prize from
the elections. An increase in satisfaction with democracy can be linked to election
outcomes through several mechanisms: first, winners might expect to get more
utility from the system than losers (in terms for example of implementation of
public policies), second, winning can generate positive emotions, and third, win-
ners’ drive for cognitive consistency may motivate them to adjust legitimacy beliefs
about the system that supports their political views (Anderson et al., 2005). In this
regard, Plescia (2019) found many supporters of parties excluded from government
after the elections interpreting the election outcome as a win for their party due to
a good showing in the election. The peculiarity of the EP elections is that they are
run by national parties within a European arena, which affords both parties and
voters the opportunity to proclaim themselves winners if they are the largest party
in either the European or the national election competition or have performed well
at either one of these two levels. In particular, because the national-level electoral
dimension counts during EP elections (Van der Eijk and Franklin, 1996), the result
can be an extrapolation of experience in EP politics from the national political
arena (Harteveld et al., 2013). All in all, we put forward the following hypotheses:
H1a: Electoral participation increases SwEUD.
H1b: Winning or performing well – in either the national or the European level
competition - increases SwEUD.
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Catalyst of love or alienation effect?
Democratic theory tells us that the group of voters and the group of non-voters
should differ, but no distinction is made within both groups. The winner-loser gap
literature tends to disregard non-voters and simply compares winners with losers
of elections. More recent works have started taking the within winner group dif-
ferentiation into account noticing that the effect of winning is more pronounced
among those with an attachment to their party (Singh, 2014). Similarly, others
have found that the impact of winning on satisfaction is moderated by the relative
performance of the party that one supports (e.g., Curini et al., 2015) or by political
sophistication (Nadeau et al., 2019). None of these studies, however, has taken into
account a crucial differentiation among all citizens, namely the initial level of
attachment to and perceived legitimacy of the democratic regime. We contend
this aspect is crucial and especially so in EP elections. In the context of EP elec-
tions, we posit attention to the concept of ‘exclusive national identity’ (Hooghe
and Marks, 2004).
While support for the EU has been measured in a number of different ways in
the literature (see Boomgaarden et al., 2011), its identity dimension has received
growing attention in recent years (Hobolt and De Vries, 2016). In particular, prior
research has found that the relationship between national and European is double-
edged. On the one hand, national and European identities may reinforce each
other (Citrin and Sides, 2004; Klandermans, 2014), on the other, a strong national
attachment can weaken support for European integration precisely because the
European project undermines national borders (Carey, 2002). As explained by
Hooghe and Marks (2005), much will depend on whether national identity is
‘exclusive’ or not (Hooghe and Marks, 2004): when national identity is exclusive,
it is a strong obstacle that prevents not only people from supporting the European
integration but also from trusting and having confidence in the EU project
(Krouwel and Abts, 2007).
We argue that such principled and ideological opposition to the EU will impede
the voter-abstainer and the winner–loser gaps to materialize among exclusive
nationalist citizens for several reasons.
First, while elections are overwhelmingly assumed to be ‘a public demonstration
of the legitimacy of the regime’ (Gilison, 1968: 814) because ‘through participation
citizens legitimize a regime’ (Le Duc, 1996: 344), citizens holding an extreme,
enduring and profound rejection of the ‘ideal’ of the EU, do not vote to legitimize
the EU but to ‘protest’ against it (Krouwel and Abts, 2007). Hence, electoral
participation is unlikely to make the system more legitimate in their eyes.
Second, and relatedly, EP elections foster the politicization of Europe itself
(Grande and Hutter, 2016), providing visibility to anti-EU parties’ rhetoric and
nationalist parties (Halikiopoulou et al., 2012). The visibility that anti-EU parties’
rhetoric receives during the EP elections is likely to resonate especially well among
exclusive nationalist citizens, which are also those more commonly supporting
nationalist, anti-EU parties in the first place (De Vries and Edwards, 2009). The
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anti-EU rhetoric during election times may fuel anti-EU sentiments similarly to the
popularity of populist parties, which has been shown to sustain political dissatis-
faction (Rooduijn et al., 2016). Hence, a better performance of the supported party
provides exclusive nationalist citizens with cognitive consistency with their per-
ceived rejection of and non-attachment to the EU. There is thus the distinct pos-
sibility that participating and winning do not boost satisfaction with democracy
among citizens with exclusive national identity.
H2a: Electoral participation does not increase SwEUD among citizens with exclusive
national identity.
H2b: Winning or performing well does not increase SwEUD among citizens with
exclusive national identity.
Methodology
We use data from a panel election study conducted for the RECONNECT project
in Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Poland, and Spain.1
Hence, we can include countries in the north, south, west, and east of Europe.
The survey comprises two waves, with about 2000 respondents in the pre-election
questionnaire conducted during the period from April 2 to 21 and about 1000 in
the post-election questionnaire conducted after the election, i.e., from May 27 to
June 24, 2019. The quota-based survey conducted online guarantees that the sam-
ples in each country are representative of the (national) population under study
with regard to age, gender, education, and region (see the Online appendix for a
detailed comparison between key characteristics in the sample (respondents in
wave 1 and 2) and the country population). Both waves include a question
asking respondents how satisfied they are with the way democracy works in
Europe on a 0 to 10 scale where ‘0’ means ‘completely unsatisfied’ and ‘10’
means ‘completely satisfied’. The only exception is Austria where satisfaction
was measured on a 1 to 5 scale where ‘1’ means ‘completely unsatisfied’ and ‘5’
means ‘completely satisfied’. For consistency we recode the satisfaction variable
for Austria to range from 0 to 10. These data allow us to compare satisfaction
before and after the EP elections for the same respondents.
The dependent variable is the change in satisfaction between the two waves (pre
minus post), which may range from –10 to þ10 (mean (M): .09; standard deviation
(SD): 1.97). Figure 1 illustrates the distribution in each of our eight election stud-
ies. Mean satisfaction is about 0.09 point higher after the election. This is a small
but significant (at p< 0.001) increase. The overall level of satisfaction, therefore,
does slightly increase after the election. There is, however, a good amount of
variation across countries. In Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, and Poland,
there is an increase in satisfaction after the election — albeit only significant in
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Austria (at p< 0.001). In three cases only, namely Hungary, Italy, and Spain, there
is a slight albeit non-significant decrease.
To test the relation between turning out to vote and satisfaction with democ-
racy, we created a dummy variable taking a value of 0 if the respondent did not
vote at the EP election and 1 if she did (M: .80, SD: .40). Turnout ranges from
about 73% in Hungary to 87% in Germany, clearly above the actual rate, which in
all countries was considerably lower. This is an unfortunate but very common
problem of existing survey data since turnout measures a socially desirable behav-
iour that tends to be systematically overestimated in survey data (e.g., Blais and
Daoust, 2020). The overestimation is not, however, a major problem for our infer-
ence purpose. This is due to the fact that existing studies using validated turnout
demonstrate that ‘researchers will rarely be grossly misled by using any of these
three sources [intention to vote, reported vote or validated vote]. The same vari-
ables tend to be influential in all three, and their relative proportions are usually
(though not universally) unchanged’ (Achen and Blais, 2016: 206). Don’t knows
and refusals are dropped from our analyses.2
To test H1b and H2b, we need to operationalize winning, which is less straight-
forward at the EU level compared to national elections. Winners are usually clas-
sified as those individuals who voted for ‘the actual party in power’ (Anderson and
Guillory, 1997: 72), the party that formed the government following the election
(or parties in the case of coalition governments). As already discussed in previous
sections, while there is no national government at the EU level, for the EP elec-
tions, one must take into account whether citizens voted for the largest party either
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Figure 1. Change in SwEUD across eight European countries.
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League was overwhelmingly considered in the media as the winner of the elections
in Italy,3 but the European party the League was affiliated to only ranked fifth in
the 2019 EP election in terms of overall performance. In light of this consideration,
we rely on different operationalizations of the variable winning. This will also
afford us an opportunity to study what winning really means at the EU level.
First, since the largest party is the one voters often identify as winner (Singh
et al., 2012), we rely on a dummy measure that takes the value of 1 when the
respondent voted for the party that received the largest amount of vote separately
at the national (M: .27, SD: .44) or the European level (M: .19, SD: .40) and 0
otherwise. For example, in Italy the national-level winners are the voters of the
League, which was the party receiving the largest amount of votes in the country;
the winners at the European level are the supporters of the party affiliated with the
European People’s party group receiving the largest amount of votes at the
European level namely the supporters of Go Italy. We also follow recent works
on satisfaction with democracy and use a numerical indicator of electoral perfor-
mance, namely the percentage of votes obtained by the party supported by the
respondent, again considering separately the national (M: 20.48, SD: 12.65) and
the European outcome (M: 13.67, SD: 6.13). Specifically, for the European level,
we consider the performance of the European party group the national party is
affiliated to.4 Non-voters are dropped from this part of the analysis.
To capture the profound rejection of the EU in its core or identity, we follow
Hooghe and Marks (2005) among others and rely on the concept of exclusive
national identity. To measure exclusive national identity we combine two survey
questions asking our respondents ‘How close do you feel to Europe?’ and ‘How
close do you feel to COUNTRY?’, respectively, using a scale from 0 to 3 where 0
stands for ‘not at all’ and 3 stands for ‘very close’. Exclusive national identity is the
difference between these two variables in the form of national identity – Europe
identity. The variable displays increasingly larger values the more people feel exclu-
sively national and increasingly smaller values the more they feel exclusively
European with a 0 value when they are equally attached to their country and
Europe. While the original variable can theoretically range from –3 to þ3, we
standardize it to range from –1 to þ1 (M: .195; SD: .337). Figure 2 illustrates
the distribution of the variable in the countries analyzed. Exclusive national iden-
tity is particularly high in Denmark (M: .347; SD: .308), followed by France (M:
.265; SD: .308), and significantly lower in countries such as Spain (M: .085; SD:
.325) and Hungary (M: .067; SD: .365). Figure 2 shows there is conspicuous var-
iation across countries.5
In all our models, we control for the level of satisfaction in the pre-electoral
survey to neutralize floor and ceiling effects (Blais and Gelineau, 2007); this setup
allows us to compare SwEUD of winners to that of losers, relative to their levels
before the election. In doing this, we closely follow the existing literature studying
satisfaction with democracy at the national level (Blais et al., 2017; Singh et al.,
2012). As it is standard in the existing literature to assume a relation between mass
support at the national and at the EU level — albeit the direction of causation
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remains disputed (Kritzinger, 2003; Rohrschneider, 2002), we control in our
models for satisfaction at the national level (Pearson r correlation between satis-
faction with democracy at the EU and national level is 0.33 in wave 1 and 0.40 in
wave 2). Also, it is known that those who are interested in the elections are more
prone to participate, know more about the EU, and have higher levels of SwEUD
(Karp et al., 2003), hence we control for both interest in the EU election and
political efficacy (both internal and external) (e.g., Karp and Banducci, 2008).6
We also control for gender, age, and education. Importantly, all our control var-
iables are measured in the pre-electoral wave. Descriptive statistics for all our
variables are presented in the Online appendix.
Empirical findings
We start by examining the impact of electoral participation and winning on
changes in satisfaction. We then examine the moderating role of exclusive national
identity.
Voting, winning, and satisfaction with democracy
Model 1 in Table 1 shows that voting (versus abstaining) has a statistically signif-
icant impact on changes in satisfaction (our dependent variable) albeit the coeffi-
cient is substantially quite small. Specifically, all else being equal, voting slightly
increases satisfaction by about 0.17 point on a scale from –10 to þ10 among voters
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Figure 2. Distribution of exclusive national identity across eight European countries.
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satisfaction for abstainers and voters. The effect is remarkably similar to what
prior research has found in the context of national elections, i.e., an effect of
about 0.2 point on a scale from -10 to þ10 (e.g., Kostelka and Blais, 2018). This
provides overall support for H1a.
Moving to winning, Models 2 and 3 in Table 1 display the effect of winning at
the national and European level, respectively. All else being equal, winners at the
national level are about 0.02 point more satisfied after the election (on a scale from
-10 to þ10) compared to losers; the effect is, however, much stronger when we
consider the winners at the European level in which case, all else being equal,
winners are about 0.29 point more satisfied after the election compared to
losers. Figure 3(b) shows the predicted change in satisfaction for losers and win-
ners. The graph clarifies that while losers display consistently lower levels of
changes in satisfaction after the election than winners, the changes for winners
at the European level are statistically significantly different from those of winners
at the national level.
When interpreting the results of Models 2 and 3 in Table 1, namely that winners
at the national level are not more or less satisfied after the election compared to
losers while the effect is much stronger when we consider the winners at the
European level, two important aspects shall be considered. First, our empirical
models examine those who voted at the EP elections, who tend to be quite inter-
ested in EU politics in the first place (Van der Eijk and Oppenhuis, 1990). One
reason why the variable ‘EU winner’ is significant is that those who care to vote in
the election are particularly interested. Second, the country-level results presented
in the Online appendix, indicate that the impact of national-level wins are positive
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Figure 3. Predicted change in SwEUD (with 95% confidence intervals).
Note: Estimations based on Models 2 and 4 in Table 1.
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Hungary. The national level winners are in these cases Le Pen’s National Rally in
France, Salvini’s Lega in Italy, and Orban’s Fidesz in Hungary. So the results of
Model 2 in Table 1 are driven by the fact that there is no increase in SwEUD for
national-level wins in these three countries.
Models 4 and 5 in Table 1 display the effect of a one percentage point vote
increase on changes in satisfaction respectively for the national-level party and the
European party group. Starting with the former, we find that, after the election,
satisfaction is .007 point higher on a –10 to þ10 scale compared to before the
election when one’s party’s vote share is one percentage point higher. In other
words, for every 10 percentage point increase in the vote share of a supported
party, satisfaction with democracy is expected to increase by 0.07 point on a scale
from –10 to þ10 (see Figure 3(c)). The effect is somewhat smaller compared to
what for example Kostelka and Blais (2018) found in the case of national elections,
where the equivalent increase is 0.15 point. When we consider the performance of
the European party group, we find that satisfaction is .039 point higher after an
election when one’s party’s vote share increases by 1 percentage point (see Figure 3
(d)). This is slightly larger than what has been found in the context of national
elections. Taken together, the results provide support for H1b.7
Since there could be some concerns related to the inclusion of Hungary and
Poland due to the recent events and threats to liberal democracy in these countries,
we re-ran the models presented in Table 1 dropping these two countries. The
results presented in the Online appendix show that the findings are remarkably
consistent and robust to the inclusion or exclusion of these two countries. The
country-individual analyses shown in the Online appendix confirm our main find-
ings.8 We have also cross-checked the results by implementing a diff-in-diff pro-
pensity score matching estimator. This estimator brings several advantages
avoiding functional form assumptions (see Emmenegger et al. (2017) for a recent
application). The results in the Online appendix clearly validate those presented in
the article. There are no consistent differences between those with low and high
interest in the EP elections, between those with low and high knowledge of parties’
position on a pro-unification/integration vs. anti-unification/integration scale and
between those with low and high factual knowledge about EU institutions (full
results are presented in the Online appendix).9
The moderating role of exclusive national identity on changes in satisfaction
with democracy
The models in Table 1 indicate a direct negative impact of exclusive national
identity on changes in satisfaction, which suggests that those with an exclusive
national identity feel less satisfied with EU democracy after the elections. The next
figure illustrates the marginal effect of voting and winning on changes in SwEUD
after the election among people with different levels of exclusive national identity
(full results available in the Online appendix). Starting with voting, Figure 4(a)
indicates that the substantial effect of voting is almost exactly the same, that is,
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small but positive, across degrees of exclusive national identity. The relationship
becomes statistically non-significant at the extremes simply because of the smaller
number of observations, but the effects remain remarkably similar. Given that the
interaction is non-significant for turnout suggesting that the impact of voting is not
weaker or stronger among those with exclusive national identity, we reject H2a.
Figure 4(b) presents the results of the interaction between winning and exclusive
national identity to provide a direct test of H2b. The plot shows a significant and
negative interaction indicating that winning has basically no effect when people are
alienated with the EU. The results are consistent if we consider party performance.
Specifically, Figure 4(c) shows the impact of a 10 percentage point vote increase at the
national level for different levels of exclusive national identity. It shows that the
higher exclusive national identity the lower the impact of party performance on
SwEUD, which is in line with H2b. In other words, while an increase in the vote
share of the supported party has a positive effect among those that do not have an
exclusive national identity, party performance at the national level has basically no
effect when people are alienated with the EU. Exclusive national identity, however,
does not seem to moderate the effect of the performance of the European party group
on SwEUD.10 We discuss the implications of these findings in the conclusion.
Conclusion
Holding elections means giving ordinary citizens an opportunity to voice their
preferences and have a say in the actual political government of an institution.
Stable findings in the existing literature demonstrate that holding elections
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Figure 4. The moderating role of exclusive national identity (with 95% confidence intervals).
Note: Estimations based on models in the Online appendix.
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for abstainers and for winners more than for losers. In this study, we address the
following question: Does the legitimizing effect of elections materialize at the
supranational, EP election level? More precisely, we aimed to assess whether
people became more satisfied with the way democracy works at the EU level if
they participate in the EP election and their party performed well.
We make three important contributions. First, this is the first study to test the
expectations of the democratic theory and winner-loser gap literatures at suprana-
tional elections. While the existing literature might suggest a null effect, because of the
low stakes and the absence of a direct relationship between the outcome of the
election and the governing body, our hypotheses were that turnout and party per-
formance would play a role in the EP 2019 elections due to the changing circum-
stances these elections have been held in 2019. We do find that citizens are slightly
more satisfied when they participate in the elections and more satisfied when they win
the election and when their party receives more votes – albeit the effects are small.
Second, our study shows that the extent to which election outcomes influence
democratic satisfaction depends on individual-level exclusive national identity. For
those more alienated towards the EU, it does not matter whether their party
performed well or poorly in the election; they remain highly critical.
Third, our research design, more precisely the use of a panel survey, allows us to
measure the specific impact of the election, by comparing pre- and post-electoral
satisfaction. This approach has been used in prior research (e.g., Singh et al., 2012)
but, to our knowledge, this is the first systematic comparative study that includes
pre- and post-election measures of satisfaction with democracy at the EU level.
Our results also help clarify the meaning of winning at the EU level. Our
findings suggest that party performance at both the national and the European
level matter. This is likely due to the fact that national parties often use EP election
results as a barometer of their national-level strength. In this regard, EP elections
provide the parties with the opportunity to proclaim themselves winners either if
they won the European contest of the EP election or if they were the top perform-
ing party at the national level. It is clear however, that winning at the national level
only matters when there is an initial support for the EU in the first place. Future
work should look into the moderating role of media in framing who the winners
and losers of EP elections are.
A number of implications can be derived from our study. One implication is
that voting and winning at the EP level have similar positive effects as compared to
national elections in fostering satisfaction with democracy. An obvious future line
of research is to look at how long this positive effect lasts possibly leveraging on
panel data spanning more than one EP election. Another important implication
relates to the moderating effect of exclusive national identity. Our measure of
exclusive national identity reports over 16% of respondents fully alienated with
the EU. Given that turnout remains rather low at EP elections and those alienated
with the EU are unlikely to tune in during the elections, we can conclude that in
line with previous findings (Beaudonnet and Franklin, 2016), the positive effect of
EP elections is unlikely to be broadly felt by the population. For this group of
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citizens in particular, we find that a better party performance does not produce
greater satisfaction with the state of EU democracy. In this regard, longitudinal
panel data can also provide the opportunity to study what it means to be a repeat-
ed loser in EP elections. It is possible, in fact, that the lack of an increase in
satisfaction with democracy for exclusive nationalist voters is due to an alienation
with electoral victories over time. In short, EU elections do contribute to slightly
increase the legitimacy of the EU at least among those who participate, but not
among those who completely reject that legitimacy to start with. Mission not quite
accomplished.
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1. For more information on RECONNECT (‘Reconciling Europe with its Citizens
through Democracy and the Rule of Law’), see the project website: www.reconnect-
europe.eu (accessed 30 September 2020). Data for all countries except Austria come
from RECONNECT (Plescia et al., 2020). Data for Austria come from the Austrian
National Election Study (Aichholzer et al., 2020) and include a slightly higher number
of respondents in both waves.
2. Including these missing responses as non-voters (i.e., abstainers) does not change our
substantive findings.
3. See for example: https://www.politico.eu/article/european-parliament-election-2019-
matteo-salvinis-wins-big-but-only-in-italy/ (accessed 30 September 2020).
4. In the very few instances the party voted for by the respondents was not affiliated to a
European party group, the value of this variable is 0. Note that removing these obser-
vations instead has no effect on the findings.
5. As shown in the Online appendix, differences in exclusive national identity between
waves are very small and non-significant in all eight countries examined.
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6. Interest in the EU election relies on a question asking respondents how interested they
were in the upcoming EP election on a scale from 0 ‘not at all interested’ to 3 ’very
interested’. The measurement of internal political efficacy relies on two survey ques-
tions: ‘I have a good understanding of the important political issues facing the
European Union (EU)’ and ‘I consider myself well qualified to participate in EU pol-
itics’. The measurement of external political efficacy relies on two survey questions:
‘People like me don’t have any say in what the EU does’ and ‘No matter whom I
vote for, it won’t make a difference for the EU’.
7. Existing studies on national level elections show that the performance of the voted party
compared to the previous election matters in explaining satisfaction with democracy
(Plescia, 2019; Stiers et al., 2018). The presence of new national parties (like La
Republique en Marche in France) and the significant changes to EP group membership
between 2014 and 2019 render the comparison between the two EP elections not
straightforward. Despite this we have additionally tested the role of two variables
being the parties’ vote share difference between the 2014 and 2019 EP elections at the
national and the European level, respectively. The use of these alternative variables
confirms the main findings of this study.
8. As the Online appendix shows, the coefficients are in the right positive direction in 31
over a total of 40 models. In particular, they are in the right direction in 5 out of
8 countries for voted or abstain models, in 5 out of 8 countries and in 7 countries
out of 8, respectively, for the two dummy winning variables at the national and the
European level. When it comes to the continuous variable of party performance, the
coefficients are in the right positive direction in 6 out of 8 countries at the national level
and in 8 out of 8 countries at the European level.
9. We thank an anonymous reviewer for the suggestion of implementing a diff-in-diff
propensity score matching estimator, which brings even more confidence in the robust-
ness of our results. One should also note that the boost in SwEUD is not just an
extrapolation from rising satisfaction with national democracy, in fact there is no con-
sistent effect of turnout or winning on satisfaction with national democracy after the EP
elections.
10. The results of the interaction hold when exclusive national identity is replaced by pre-
election levels of SwEUD, trust in the EP, or extreme ideology. Still, we believe that
exclusive national identity corresponds to a broad rejection of the EU and hence cap-
tures the idea of principled and ideological opposition to the EU.
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